essential needs of human beings, without which social life would be impossible or at least less satisfactory. Law, in this sense, will be regarded as a specialized form of control exercising the systematic pressure of politically organized society. ' We have, then, to ask how law performs its function as an agency for social control. It does so by meeting those needs or demands of certain groups of men in society which actually gave rise to its origin, in so far as those needs and wants still prevail in the social order, and by meeting such additional needs or demands as may be thought, from time to time, more properly to fall within the effective range of legal action. Thus we come to regard law as affording protection for certain social interests which somebody wants protected or accident gets protected and to such extent as experience and experiment demonstrate as appropriate for legal action.
A great jurist has arranged a scientific scheme of interests which the law protects.6 Like any other scientific classification of phenomena, it is appropriate and desirable for certain purposes and inadequate for other purposes. While this scheme is arranged in terms of individual interests, public interests, and social interests, and although traditional ways of thinking have misled men into assuming that individual interests were protected for their own sakes, as ends in themselves, law protects individual interests only because, and to the extent that, they represent certain social interests. These interests, protected and safeguarded by law, are not to be thought of as pure sociological fiction but are in fact derived from actual observation of legal phenomena disclosing what interests the law has actually afforded protection for, and disclosing at the same time the manner and method of such protection.7 'Pound, supra., note 2. 'The reader may be referred, for example, to the chapter and section headings of the best of the modem casebooks on torts, Bohlen's Cases on Torts (2d ed.; I925):
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Among the various social interests protection for which is continually afforded in many diverse forms in the law is that which grows out of the compelling need in any group to be secure against those forms of action and courses of conduct by individuals which threaten the existence of the group. This, perhaps, is the paramount social interest. Wherever its pressure is felt in law other interests give way, depending on the comparative intensity of the conflicting and opposing interests. "It is not too much to say that law arose and primitive law existed simply to maintain one narrow phase of this interest, the social interest in peace and order. 8See Pound, "Theory of Social Interest," supra, note 6, at p. 24. means which were gradually worked out in the endeavor to maintain that social interest.
Thus it is that the law apparently creates rights to protect individual interests. What it is doing, however, is simply devising new means to protect a new social interest-one that has arisen in comparatively recent times.
It is to be observed, then, that if law protects individual interests exclusively for the reason that they are involved in protection of certain social interests, each individual interest should be referable to some corresponding social interest. Here it is necessary to examine the implications and bases of this sociological appraisal of law to find a theory of society that will fit the phenomena which the history of the common law reveals.
II. THE SOCIAL THEORY BEHIND LAW
We are pretty much committed to the view that no longer is there any merit to be derived from conceptions of the state which present it as some ideal entity possessing the classic and traditional attributes of indivisible and illimitable sovereignty. This notion, perhaps expedient at one time, seems to have outlived its usefulness. More and more we are regarding the state from a sociological viewpoint and in the words of an eminent social scientist, "We are no longer satisfied with the pious abstraction that government exists for the 'good of the governed' or for the advancement of Christian virtues in the community."10 We recognize the state as a composite of various groups existing to further various common and related interests, and while we need not go so far as Gumplowiez and others in concluding that government is merely the agency of exploitation of the many by the dominant few,"1 nor yet to the benevolent view that the state is exclusively calculated to rec-'Ibid., p. 26. We do not regard the law, then, as a moral science which only the elect can master," nor are we longer concerned with it as the pure creature of logic, producing a mechanical system of abstract rights and duties. Rather we are to emphasize the human side of law and recognize that here we have a device which society has evolved for purposes of expediency as one of the most effective instruments for control. What we actually have is primarily groups and interests. Secondarily, of course, there are individuals, but it is the group and interest aspect or the group-interest that seduces the scientific curiosity. "What we actually find in this world, what we can observe and study, is interested men-nothing more and nothing less. This is our raw material and it is our business to keep our eyes fastened to it."' The orthodox sociologist in these days conceives of government as the adjustment of these interests. Only in the legislature, however, does he see the great battle ground of the interest groups, and because the battle there is obvious and overt, he thinks it is confined to the legislature. Thus, log-31O INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS rolling, he will assume, is the characteristic of legislative technique."6 From the point of view of the jurist, however, the conflict of interests is even more intense, though more subtle, in the actual evolution of the common law. As we shall see, social pressure is exerted none the less here than elsewhere.
But the adequate sociological outlook upon law presupposes an intelligent conception of social organization and the relationship of law and the state thereto. Now it has been pointed out that the community is invariably the center of spontaneous and voluntary common life. It may be regarded as the most creative factor in modern civilization. 17 We are learning to think of a community as a complex of individuals, institutions, associations, and customs with the underlying principle expressed in the word itself, something involving communal features, something in common.'8 As Dewey says, "There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community and communication. "'9 We regard society as something slightly apart from community, namely, the social organization of the community.
Here we find various groups or associations, both of a purposive nature, designed to achieve some definite and avowed end,20 and of a non-purposive nature, depending upon the condition in society in which men find themselves. In other words, men consciously group themselves together to attain certain avowed ends, and are grouped together from the point of view of their social activity in gaining or seeking ends. The grouping, it is to be noticed, in either event, is based upon human activity.
of function. By function we mean the activity involved in gaining certain ends-the activity of one group or association in its relation to others, both individuals and groups.
Thus to know the function of a group, we must first know its purposes."
But in the very idea of purpose we postulate certain interests. To say that a person or group has this or that purpose, we obviously imply that the person or group has this or that interest. In turn the terms "function" and "purpose" applied to groups involve a reference to some method of evaluation, as they place each group into relation both to its own members and to other groups and institutions of which society is constituted. We see at once that to criticize the social function of a group or association it is necessary that there be some common standard of evaluation.22 Evaluation of ends can be made only with reference to consequences of the realization thereof. Hence, when two apparently competitive ends are presented, their collateral consequences must be considered.
Thus if they can both be regarded as means to a further end,/ their relative value can be determined. The "further end" thus provides the standard of evaluation. This is a process of elaboration. In any method of evaluation, some preferred end must remain tentatively unquestioned.23 Thus we refer them to the community in order to apprehend their relative significance-in other words, in order to evaluate the social function of the group.
In referring the interests of the group to the community, there are two factors involved: first, the extent of the community that is affected by the interest (by which the social value of a given interest must depend upon the number of the indi- ' Cole, supra, note i8, at p. 53. other, trespassing thereon. Thus it is the groups that conflict, and it is group interests that the law deals with, balancing them, not upon any "fundamental principles of justice," but upon a seasoned and experience-based consideration of communal welfare, or social utility.
The most insignificant suit between two petty disputants over a contract is dealt with socially on the basis of great group interests which have established the conditions and the bounds for it. All law is social. Every bit of law activity may, it is true, be stated as a sum of individual "acts"; but every bit may also be stated in group terms, and this latter is our method of statement here. We do not ignore John Doe's doings, but we Jurists have sought from time to time for the comfort and satisfaction of illusory exactness and certainty. Accordingly, attempts have been made to develop and cultivate a legal order which was of such logical perfection and adequacy that results could be accurately and scientifically predicted in advance. We are finding, however, that the only basis for prediction which gives any promise of satisfactory results is the basis of observed experiment and scientific study of the legal order, as a functional phase of social organization. In other words, we must master the law as social phenomena based upon sociological facts. We are learning to criticize rules of law on the basis of their efficacy in adjusting group interests by a reference to their significance to the community.
And what is it that we mean by social interests or group interests as opposed to the interests of the individual constituents of the group or community? In the first place, we must not impute to the groups or to the community a reality which does not in fact exist, nor need we impute to the community or the groups an existence of a metaphysical nature. We will not think of the state, the community, the group as existing in and for themselves. We will not impute to them a being or a mind or a will or an interest which is not there in fact. We will think only of the interests, the wills, the beings, and the existences of those who are members of the community or the groups.25 On the other hand, we will not make the equally fatal mistake of thinking of the community or the groups as the mere sum of their individual members in their individual In Queen v. Instan,27 Lord Coleridge, in a famous dictum, said: "It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded in a moral obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation without legal enforcement." It has been contended that this is inaccurate; that when the common law sometimes imposes liability without fault, for example, there is legal but no moral liability.28 But it is to be observed that even here there is clearly a duty arising out of morality, though not individual morality. When we put our emphasis upon rational29 group' morality rather than personal morality, we find the basis of the common-law rule as surely moral here as elsewhere, and Lord Coleridge's statement stands unimpeached. The problem is always whether the law ought to raise a legal duty from the moral duty, and this is eminently a problem of making law;
and it is to this task that the pragmatist method of cautious advance from case to case is peculiarly applicable.
The making of law now becomes a process of interpretation on the part of the lawmakers, and primarily of the court, of the desires and the interests of the community. Upon a reasoned and intelligent weighing of these interests will depend the activities of legislatures and of courts. The sociological standard is therefore inevitable. The lawmaker must project his decision into the future and anticipate its consequences there. If, on the whole view, a given adjustment of the conflicting interests gives promise of a satisfactory and highly beneficial result for the community as a whole, his proposed decision becomes law. It is submitted that it is not too much to say that this is the real process behind the entire development of the common law. It is of no slight significance to notice that when a determined anticipation of the future consequences is proved by experience to be erroneous, the common law has not hesitated to retreat and strike out in a new direc- Hence, we claim no quality of universality for justice. We concede it to be nothing more than a hypothesis, in other words, a sociological probability.32
In the same spirit of realism, how are we to regard the law? It has been said by eminent jurists that the law as we know it at any given time can be nothing more than a prophecy of what a court of justice will in fact do under a given set of circumstances.3" We will then think of law as merely a prediction of what interpretation a court will place upon the facts of experience as they apply to the given conflict of interests.
We have then, it is to be observed, a working conception of law, which can be described by nothing so well as a "juridical probability." From our present viewpoint, then, we may regard the law as nothing more than a "juridical probability," the purpose of which is to adjust the conflicting interests which continually press for recognition and protection in accordance with the "sociological probabilities" of the consequences of this or that there is available an explanation of existing social phenomena which squares with all the facts of experience as we know them in the legal order. We will have occasion to look into several branches of the common law to see if we can detect the working of the principles as explained and described here. We need not concern ourselves with the purported reasons given by the courts, except in so far as these reasons ex- felt a great difficulty in answering certain questions submitted to the court; first, because they were not put with reference to a particular case which might explain or limit the generality of their terms; secondly, because no argument had been heard upon them; and, thirdly, because of a fear that the answers might embarrass the administration of justice when they might be cited in criminal trials.35
We shall consider the development of certain rules of law, together with deviations from their logical implications, as the pressure of social interests has been felt. The rule of the criminal law developed that consent to the taking was defense to larceny.36 But where it was necessary to entrap the criminal and the defendant did not know of the assent, it was held to be a crime. "7 Here the judges tried to employ logic to rationalize the situation and find the assent "unreal. " The truth was that the assent was quite real and the case is illogical in view of the current conception of larceny. The judges, however, knew that any other rule would not work, that it might embarrass the administration of criminal justice in the future. In other words, as the pragmatist would say, they were looking to the consequences in the future. Observe also the rule that consent is no defense in prosecution for assault, although it is a defense to an action in tort for the same acts.38 The reason is that experience has shown the better rule for each situation and, as
Justice Holmes has said, the life of the law is experience rather than logic.
Again, it is a commonplace of criminal law that while intoxication in general is no excuse for crime, yet it will be a defense if one is so drunk that he is incapable of entertaining the specific intent that some crimes require." But when it came about in specific cases that drunken persons stabbed others to death or nearly so, it was laid down that drunkenness could not affect the question of malicious intent when defendant had used a dangerous instrument.4 It was felt that the defendant ought to be punished and for practical purposes; he had the necessary intent.
The courts have purported to assume that the burden of proof in insanity cases must be deduced from "fundamental premises" of criminal law. Thus the presumption of innocence as a premise has given rise to a brood of monsters in the form of absurd decisions amounting in actual practice to raising a presumption of insanity whenever the accused raises the the inevitable conflict of interests, and it is to these conflicting interests that the law is applied as an agency for balancing and weighing and determining just how far this social interest will be protected at the expense of that interest. Ideally, of course, the object is to protect as many interests as possible at the least sacrifice of the totality of social interests involved in the conflict.47
It is further obvious that the intensity of the pressure of these social interests will vary under an infinite variety of circumstances, conditions, and situations. Thus it is difficult, if not impossible, for the law to work out a scheme of protection which defines and delimits the exact boundary within which any given social interest (hence, such individual interests as may be referred to it) will be protected. Much more satisfactorily can the law develop certain principles-that is, generalized hypotheses or assumptions of protection-and standards-that is, methods for determining the application of these principles in concrete cases, as they arise. In this way
the body of what we know as the common law has developed.
Thus it is that the common law has consisted of a body of materials not the least important of which is the technique of procedure to be applied by a learned and trained profession.48
The common law, from the very beginning, soon developed a technique which allowed for the expanding and shrinking of rules of law to lend effective protection to conflicting interests. In the early stages, frequent development of a legal principle upon the grounds of "convenience" are noticed.49
This fule could not apply or that one was not to prevail because it would be "inconvenient." Littleton declared that "the law will sooner suffer a mischief than an inconvenience," nearly represents the explanation of the growth of the common law without the qualification. The effect of precedent, of course, is not to be minimized, but the deeper principle involved is that precedent has been followed to achieve certainty and uniformity only when these ends were evaluated higher than other social interests.54
It is not the following of precedent, merely as such, that makes the common law or that lends continuity to the developed body of legal materials which we think of as the law of the land, nor is it any persistent universality of any of our fundamental dogmas. Scarcely any of the broad principles of the Year Books are to be found in recognized form in the modern reports. Pound says,
More important, however, is the frame of mind that lies behind this traditional technique of the common-law lawyer. It is a frame of mind which looks at things in the concrete, not in the abstract; which puts its faith in experience rather than in abstractions. It is a frame of mind which prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of experience from this case or that case to the next case, as justice in each case seems to require, instead of trying to refer everything back to supposed universals.55
As the body of legal materials accumulates, however, and the practice of looking to judicial experience and custom takes stronger hold, rules, worked out for concrete cases and types of cases, have a natural tendency to extend themselves, both by stare decisis and by analogy.-But with slight variations in facts and circumstances, when a different social interest makes itself felt, or presses more intensely for recognition and protection, so an "exception" is made to the "general rule," or perhaps a "fiction" will be employed which affords the desired protection to the new social interest or to the one which exerts the added pressure. In this manner, the "science" of law develops, using science in the sense of the analytical jurist, and the new social interest makes its appearance in the body of law in the form of a "reason" for the exception or the fiction. Thus we acquire the paraphernalia of science and categories, classifications and rules are developed.
An example or two will suffice to illustrate. Let us consider one of the best known of the general rules of the law of agency. It is commonly said that the law imputes to the principal and charges him with all notice or knowledge relating to the subject matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting within the scope of the agency.56 It is sometimes said that the reason for this rule is that there is a reasonable inference that the agent will impart the information to his principal.57 However, it is worth while noticing that the law "conclusively presumes" that such knowledge has been imparted from the agent to the principal,58 which suggests that, whatever might have been the original rationale of the rule, it no longer depends upon such reasoning. It is said that it is required by a sound public policy.59 Here public policy is another name for the social interest in the general business morals. A sound commercial policy requires that business be carried on upon such a basis. Thus it is in these cases that it is immaterial whether the agent has actually imparted such information to the principal or not.
As well settled as this rule is, it is equally well settled that when the agent is acting adversely to the principal, the rule does not apply.60 Some of the courts argue speciously that inasmuch as the original rule was based upon the duty that the agent owed to tell his principal and the corresponding pre- safety of the public forbids a person to deny knowledge while he is so dealing as to keep himself ignorant, and yet all the while let his agents know, and himself perhaps profit by that knowledge. In such a case it would be most iniquitous and most dangerous to give shelter and encouragement to all kinds of fraud, were the law not to consider the knowledge of one as common to both, whether it be so in fact or not." sumption that he would so tell him, the rule should not apply when the agent acting adversely to the principal, could not be expected to impart such knowledge to the principal.' This, however, will not do. It was a sound public policy, the social interest in the general morals and business ethics and the desire to encourage commerce, that caused the original rule to be adopted. The need for such protection is obviously wanting when the agent acts adversely to his principal. Another reason is sometimes given here, that inasmuch as the pretended agent is really acting on his own account, since adversely to his principal, he is not acting within the scope of his authority.62 The fallacy here is so elementary as not to need' discussion. Other varieties of the same proposition are sometimes given to account for the exception. The real reason back of the exception is that the change in factual circumstances has changed the intensity of the competing social interest. Now it is thought that it is not necessary to hold the principal for the protection of commerce, or perhaps it is thought that commerce as a whole would be encouraged more by allowing men to deal through agents without attaching such a high degree of liability.
Again, there is an exception even to this exception, for when, in spite of the fact that the agent was acting adversely to his principle, it is necessary for the principal to trace his claim exclusively through the "tainted source" it is held that he is bound by the agent's knowledge." The legal reason given here is that if the principal cares to ratify and indorse the acts of the agent, he cannot accept the advantages without also assuming the burden which makes him liable for the fraud.64 But this is not so much a legal reason as a moral one, erty is intrusted to one whose ordinary business it is to sell for himself or another such property, third parties will be justified in relying upon that person's apparent ownership.08 In Levi v. Booth,69 the owner of a diamond had intrusted the 'same to an itinerant vendor of diamonds with the authority to get an offer for the diamond. The agent, however, disposed of the same as his own, and subsequently the real owner was allowed to recover the ring from the bona fide purchaser.
Here the rule is apparently conflicting with the decision in Pickering v. Busk. How, then, may the divergence be accounted for? In both cases the agents were dealers. In both cases they were intrusted with possession. In both cases the third party dealt with the agent relying upon his apparent ownership of the property. The cases are usually treated as being contradictory. They are, however, quite satisfactory. If we look to the real consideration behind Pickering v. Busk, it is observed to be the social interest involved in promoting trade and encouraging commerce. It is highly desirable that the public be entitled to rely upon the possession of personal property by regular dealers as cutting off any rights of undisclosed principals. Accordingly, it may very well be that a "sound public policy" will demand the protection of those Thus we find another exception to a general logical rule, the only reason for which is the varying intensity of the competing social interests involved. In these cases the law protects first the social interest in encouraging trade and commerce, and, upon a slightly changing set of facts, it will afford its protection to the social interest in individual life and property.
Again, nothing is better settled in the law of contracts than the proposition that when A and B contract, A's promise to B can be enforced by no one but B, the promisee.7" This was the general rule at the common law, and yet it was equally well settled that if B were acting as agent for the undis, The real truth of the whole matter is that here were in competition opposing social interests. The social interest in individual life and freedom of trade and contract is disguised in the general principle of the common law that a man may choose with whom he will enter into contractual relations.
This was responsible for the original rule that only parties to the contract could sue. On the other hand, a wise and just "public policy" demanded that the party enjoying the benefits of a contract be compelled to assume its burdens. To make the situation fair all around, it was necessary to allow such party his action in his own name to enforce his rights. Thus, as variations in factual situations raised new social interests to be protected, the consistency of the common law is retained only by the use of a fiction.
To illustrate again how inexact the logic of law becomes when the pressure of social interests is strong enough, let us again go to the law of agency to consider the case of an action brought against an undisclosed principal upon an act or contract which was expressly prohibited by the principal. It is now firmly established that such an action may be maintained and a recovery allowed in all cases when if the agency had been disclosed there would have been a recovery on the grounds of apparent authority.75 There is no logical explanation for the rule. There cannot be an implied authority because the principal has expressly prohibited the acts of the agent. It is equally clear that there can be no estoppel because the third party was in no sense misled, the fact of agency being at the time undisclosed. It cannot be said that he 7TMechem on Agency (2d ed.), sec. i768.
